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Abstract 
Four experiments investigated the effects of stimuli discrepant with 
schemata of varying strength on three surprise components: The interruption of 
ongoing activities (indexed by response time increase), the focusing of attention 
on the schema-discrepant stimulus (indexed by memory performance), and the 
feeling of surprise (indexed by self-reports). Response times were consistently 
found to increase with schema strength. This effect was attributed to the 
increasing difficulty of schema revision. In contrast, memory for the schema-
discrepant stimulus was not affected by schema strength, supporting the 
hypothesis that schema-discrepant stimuli are stored in memory with a distinct 
tag. Finally, self-reports of surprise intensity varied with schema strength only if 
they were made immediately after the surprising event without any intervening 
questions, suggesting that self-reports of surprise are highly susceptible to 
memory distortions. 
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The purpose of the experiments described in this article is to contribute to 
the empirical investigation of the emotion of surprise. More precisely, the aim of 
the present study was to examine the effects of the strength of the cognitive 
structure or schema from which the surprise-eliciting event deviates, on three 
components of the surprise syndrome, namely the subjective feeling of surprise, 
the interruption of ongoing activities and the focusing of attention on the 
surprise-eliciting event. 
Previous research on surprise has been primarily focused on empirical 
demonstrations of the surprise reaction in response to schema-discrepant events 
and paid little attention to the characteristics of surprise-eliciting conditions and 
their effects on the different components of surprise addressed in the present 
study (e.g., Charlesworth, 1964; Desai, 1939; Meyer Niepel, Rudolph, & 
Schützwohl, 1991; Niepel, Rudolph, Schützwohl, & Meyer, 1994). For example, 
Meyer et al. (1991) showed that a schema-discrepant event indeed causes the 
surprise reaction typically consisting of the subjective feeling of surprise (as 
indexed by verbal reports), the interruption of ongoing activities (as indexed by 
action delay), and the focusing of attention on the surprise-eliciting event (as 
indexed by memory for this event). However, no efforts were made to 
systematically examine the potential effects of antecedent conditions on these 
surprise components. 
The present experiments are directed at this research lacuna. They focus on 
the effects of one specific antecedent condition, namely the strength of the 
schema from which the surprise-eliciting event deviates, on the intensity of the 
subjective feeling of surprise, the duration of the interruption of ongoing 
activities, and the focusing of attention on the surprise-eliciting event. The 
following questions were addressed: Does (a) the reported intensity of the feeling 
of surprise, (b) the duration of action delay, and (c) memory performance for the 
surprise-eliciting event increase with increases in schema strength? 
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A Psychoevolutionary Model of Surprise 
The theoretical framework for the present work is a psychoevolutionary 
model of surprise described in more detail in Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl 
(1995; in press) and Schützwohl and Horstmann (in press). This model 
constitutes an integration and elaboration of the work of previous authors (e.g., 
Berlyne, 1960; Charlesworth, 1969; Darwin, 1872; Desai, 1939; Descartes, 
1649/1984; G. Mandler, 1984; Shand, 1914; Tomkins, 1962).1 It conceives of 
surprise as a (generally) adaptive, evolutionary-based mechanism that manifests 
itself at the subjective level (the feeling of surprise; e.g., Shand, 1914; Weiner, 
1986), the physiological level (e.g., the galvanic skin response; Siddle, 1991; 
Sokolov, 1990), and the behavioral level (in particular, a distinctive facial 
expression; an interruption of ongoing activities and a focusing of attention on 
the surprising event; Darwin, 1872; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; G. Mandler, 1984; 
Meyer & Niepel, 1994; Meyer et al., 1991; Niepel et al., 1994). 
It is assumed that surprise is elicited by unexpected events, with unexpected 
events being those that deviate from an activated cognitive schema. According to 
schema theories (e.g., G. Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart, 1984; Rumelhart & Ortony, 
1977), schemata are organized knowledge structures representing concepts such 
as situations, objects, events, and actions at various levels of abstractness. The 
central functions of schemata are (a) to enable the comprehension of current 
input and (b) the prediction of future events (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). In 
order to fulfill these functions effectively, schemata must provide a reasonably 
accurate account of the environment. This, in turn, requires that they are 
continuously monitored with respect to their compatibility with the data presently 
available. It is assumed that these monitoring processes run off in an automatic 
fashion, that is, they are "being controlled at levels below the level of conscious 
awareness" (Neumann, 1984, p. 256). As long as the data are compatible with the 
currently activated schema, there is no need for schema revision. This need may 
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arise, however, if a discrepancy between current input and schema is encountered 
(see also Holyoak, Koh, & Nisbett, 1989; G. Mandler, 1984; Wagner, 1978). 
Such a discrepancy between schema and current input elicits surprise. Surprise is 
conceived of as an evolutionary old mechanism whose function it is to enable 
and  motivate processes that serve to analyze the surprising event and, ultimately 
to remove the schema-input discrepancy. 
The various components of the surprise syndrome are assumed to serve 
specific subfunctions engendered by this main goal (cf. Meyer, Niepel, & 
Schützwohl, 1994; Schützwohl & Horstmann, in press). Specifically, the feeling 
of surprise is assumed to signal the occurrence of an input-schema discrepancy 
and to motivate processes aimed at the removal of this discrepancy. The 
interruption of ongoing activities permits the focusing of attention on the 
surprising event, thus preparing the thoroughgoing analysis of the surprising 
event. 
The analysis of the surprising event is assumed to comprise, in typical 
cases, the following subprocesses (for more details, see Meyer et al., 1995): (a) 
the verification of the perception or cognition of the surprising event; (b) an 
appraisal of the event’s implications for the individual’s well-being; (c) an 
appraisal of its relevance for current and future action, and (d) a search for the 
causes and potential predictors of the surprising event (Charlesworth, 1969; 
Hastie, 1984; Isaacs, 1930; Kamin, 1969; Meyer, 1988). Depending on the 
outcome of this analysis, the schema may be extended or restructured. As a 
consequence of such schema revisions, the individual is in a better position to 
anticipate and, possibly, to control future occurrences of the previously schema-
discrepant event. Thus, the ultimate adaptive function of surprise is to ensure, by 
means of schema revision or knowledge-updating, an effective prediction and 
control of the environment and hence, successful individual-environment 
transactions (G. Mandler, 1984; Rescorla, 1988). In addition, the event-analysis 
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and schema revision processes presumably do not run off in an automatic fashion 
but instead are controlled at the level of conscious awareness (G. Mandler, 1984; 
Meyer et al., 1995). 
Schema strength 
There are two structural aspects of a schema that can vary in strength: 
Variable constraints and the interconnections among variables. Schemata contain 
variables that represent the characteristic or defining attributes of a given 
concept. For example, the schema for 'face' has, among others, variables for eyes, 
ears, mouth, nose, cheeks, and chin. To facilitate the association of each schema 
variable with the correct situational aspect, the variables are specified by 
constraints which define the normal range of possible values of the variable. For 
instance, the constraints of the variable for eyes in the face schema specify the 
acceptable shape, size, color etc. of the eyes and thus help the assignment of 
appropriate values to this variable. 
Strong variable constraints allow only a well-delineated range of possible 
values as schema-compatible. That is, they impose tight and rigid restrictions on 
what counts as schema-congruent input. In contrast, weak variable constraints are 
more flexible with respect to acceptable input (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978). For 
instance, the face schema of adults is most likely characterized by relatively tight 
variable constraints with respect to the acceptable shape, size, and color of the 
eyes, ears, mouth, and nose. In contrast, the face schema of young infants is 
probably much less restrictive in these respects. 
Furthermore, schemata contain interconnections among variables which 
specify how they are related to one another. These relations can be temporal, 
spatial, correlational, or causal (e.g., Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984). In the 
example of the face schema, the relations among the variables are for the most 
part spatial, specifying the correct locations of eyes, ears, mouth, nose etc. The 
strength of the interconnections among variables ranges from obligatory to 
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optional or very weak (J. Mandler, 1984). If the connection among two variables 
is obligatory, one schema element implies or at least strongly predicts the 
existence of the other element. For example, in adults, the observation of the eyes 
in an otherwise veiled face implies the existence of the unobserved elements of 
the face, such as ears, mouth, nose, etc. In contrast, if the connection among two 
variables is weak, one schema element does not imply or only weakly predicts 
the existence of the other element. For example, in early infancy, the 
interconnections among variables of the face schema are probably rather weak. 
As a result, young infants do not yet differentiate between regular faces and faces 
with spatial disarrangements or omissions of some of their constituent elements 
(Kagan, 1971). 
The present experiments tested the effects of one aspect of schema strength 
on surprise, namely the strength of the variable constraints. It is assumed that the 
strength of the variable constraints is determined by (a) the frequency of the 
activation of the schema (e.g., G. Mandler, 1984; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1979) and (b) the variability of the values with which the schema variables have 
been associated in the past (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1968). If the variability of the 
variable values is low, then the variable constraints are expected to become 
gradually tighter and more rigid with an increasing number of schema activations 
(G. Mandler, 1984). In contrast, if the variability of the variable values is high, 
then the variable constraints should remain relaxed and flexible even if the 
schema has been frequently activated. Accordingly, in Experiments 1, 2, and 4, 
the strength of the variable constraints was manipulated by varying the frequency 
of schema activation prior to the presentation of the schema-discrepant event 
while keeping the variability of the values of the schema variables low. In 
contrast, in Experiment 3 the frequency of schema activation was held constant, 
but the variability of one of the schema variables was varied. 
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Objectives and Predictions of the Present Research 
The experimental procedure used to study the effects of schema strength on 
surprise was adopted from Meyer et al. (1991; see also Niepel et al., 1994). 
Subjects performed a choice reaction-time task. In each trial, they had to press 
one of two response keys depending on the position of a dot (task-relevant 
stimulus) which appeared during the presentation of two distractor words (task-
irrelevant stimuli). In the experimental groups, both distractors were displayed in 
normal video (NV) mode, that is, as black letters against a white background. In 
the critical trial, however, a salient change in the appearance of the distractors 
occurred: One of the two words was now displayed in reverse video (RV) mode, 
that is, as white letters against a black background. In the control groups, one of 
the two words was presented in RV mode in every single trial. Immediately after 
the critical trial, subjects had to rate the degree of the feeling of surprise elicited 
by the RV word in the critical trial and to recall the words presented in this trial. 
The recall of the RV word as compared to that of the NV word in the critical trial 
served as an index of the focusing of attention on the schema-discrepant event 
(see Meyer et al., 1991). 
It was expected that the description of the stimuli and of the task provided 
in the instructions, together with the previous experience of subjects with the 
various modes of presentation of stimuli on computer screens, would lead to the 
activation or construction of an initially fairly vague schema that would have 
relaxed and flexible variable constraints concerning the appearance of the 
stimuli. With increasing number of schema activations in each uniform trial, the 
tightness of the variable constraints was expected to gradually increase 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 4). In Experiment 3, in contrast, the mode of presentation 
of the words in the experimental condition was either varied or remained 
constant in an equal number of trials. This procedure was expected to preserve 
relaxed and flexible variable constraints concerning the mode of presentation of 
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the words in the former condition, whereas it was expected to result in tight and 
rigid variable constraints in the latter condition. 
The following effects of these manipulations of schema strength on surprise 
were predicted: 
1. The surprise ratings (the index of the intensity of the feeling of surprise) 
are higher in the experimental than in the control groups. This prediction was 
based on the assumption that the RV word in the critical trial should be a 
schema-discrepant event for experimental but not for control subjects and hence 
should elicit surprise only in the former groups and on the pertinent empirical 
findings of Meyer et al. (1991) and Niepel et. al. (1994). 
Furthermore, within the experimental condition surprise ratings were 
predicted to increase with schema strength. This prediction was based on the 
combination of the following two assumptions: First, an event conflicting with a 
strong schema should be more strongly schema-discrepant than an event 
conflicting with a weak schema. Second, the degree of unexpectedness or 
schema-discrepancy is a prime determinant of the intensity of the feeling of 
surprise (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). 
2. The response times (RTs) in the critical trial (the index of the duration of 
the interruption of ongoing activities) were predicted to be longer for 
experimental than for control subjects. This prediction was based on the 
assumption of the theoretical model of surprise described in the Introduction that 
schema-discrepant events interrupt ongoing activities and on the pertinent 
empirical findings of Meyer et al. (1991) and Niepel et. al. (1994). 
Furthermore, it was predicted that RT in the critical trial would increase 
with schema strength. This latter prediction was based on the consideration that 
processes aimed at the integration of the schema-discrepant event into the 
existing schema (i.e., schema revision) may become increasingly more difficult, 
and as a consequence would need more time, with increasing schema strength 
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(for a similar argument see Belmore, 1987; Bindra, 1959; Rumelhart, Smolensky, 
McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). More precisely, because the variable constraints 
on schema-congruent input in a weak schema are relaxed and flexible, they 
should be easily modifiable to adapt the schema to a discrepant input without the 
necessity to change the nature of the constraints (i.e., relaxed and flexible). In 
contrast, a schema characterized by rigid variable constraints should be more 
difficult to “bring into line“ with the schema-discrepant input, because the 
variable constraints have to be transformed from tight and rigid constraints into 
more relaxed and flexible ones. 
3. Concerning the memory for the two words in the critical trial (the index 
of the focusing of attention on the surprising event), it was predicted that 
experimental subjects would be better able to recall the RV word than the NV 
word in the critical trial. Furthermore, the RV word but not the NV word was 
predicted to be better recalled by the experimental subjects than by the control 
subjects (cf. Meyer et al., 1991). These predictions were based on the assumption 
that experimental subjects focus their attention selectively on the word presented 
in a schema-discrepant mode (RV word) while simultaneously neglecting the 
word presented in a schema-congruent mode (NV word; see also Metcalfe, 
1995). Control subjects were expected to pay just as little attention to the (action-
irrelevant and schema-congruent) RV word as to the NV word presented in the 
critical trial. 
With respect to the effects of schema strength on memory for the RV word 
in the experimental groups, no firm predictions seemed possible. On the one 
hand, memory performance for the RV word might be expected to be 
independent of schema strength because the function of the focusing of attention 
is assumed to consist of preparing the subsequent analysis of the schema-
discrepant event. Therefore, the focusing of attention is assumed to occur 
regardless of the strength of the disconfirmed schema. On the other hand, if the 
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length of the interruption of ongoing activities caused by schema-discrepant 
events increases with schema strength, as predicted above, memory performance 
for the RV word might alternatively also be enhanced given a strong than a weak 
schema. Enhanced memory performance could be due to a longer duration of the 
focusing of attention to the event or to deeper encoding processes (Cermak & 
Craik, 1979; Metcalfe, 1995). 
However, other relevant research suggests that the former prediction is 
more plausible, because the duration of capacity allocation or of encoding 
processes does not necessarily covary with memory performance (Graesser, 
1981; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Hunt & Mitchell, 1982). For example, 
the schema-pointer plus tag model proposed by Graesser (1981; see also 
Davidson, 1994), assumes that memory performance for schema-incongruent 
items is better than for schema-congruent ones because incongruent items are 
stored in memory with a distinct tag that facilitates their retrieval, rather than 
because of the amount of processing resources allocated during acquisition. 
Similarly, the hypothesis proposed by Hunt and Mitchell (1982) to account for 
the superior recall of distinct items "implies no correlation between capacity 
allocation and memory" (Hunt & Mitchell, 1982, p. 85). In addition, as 
mentioned, the longer RT delays in the stronger schema conditions were assumed 
to be mainly due to increasing difficulties with schema revision processes rather 
than to a more extended analysis of the schema-discrepant RV word. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, schema strength was varied by manipulating the frequency 
of the activation of the schema prior to the presentation of the schema-discrepant 
event, while keeping the variability of the values of the schema variables low. 
Four experimental and four control groups were tested. In the four experimental 
groups, the RV word was first presented in Trial 3, 13, 23 or 33, respectively. In 
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the corresponding control groups, one of the two words was presented in RV 
mode in every single trial. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 68 male and 62 female students at the 
University of Bielefeld, Germany, with a mean age of 23.8 years (SD = 4.0). 
They were paid DM 2 for their participation. 
Design. The experiment consisted of a 2 (experimental vs. control) x 4 (3, 
13, 23, or 33 trials) between-subjects factorial design. The number of participants 
in the eight experimental groups varied between 15 and 18 subjects. 
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on an Atari SM 124 monochrome 
monitor controlled by an Atari 1040ST microcomputer.  
Stimuli. Each trial started with the display of a black fixation cross against a 
white background. The display of the fixation cross was followed by the 
presentation of two distractor words, one word above the other. In the trials 
preceding the critical one, the distractor words in the experimental groups were 
presented in normal video mode (NV), that is, as black letters against a white 
background. In the critical trial, in contrast, one of the words was displayed in 
reverse video mode (RV), that is, as white letters against a black background. In 
the control groups, one word was presented in NV mode and the other word in 
RV mode in every single trial. The target stimulus consisted of a small black dot 
which appeared during the presentation of the word pair either above or below 
the words. Examples of the NV and RV trials along with the sequence of 
presentation of the stimuli are shown in Figure 1. 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
______________________ 
The fixation cross was presented for 1,400 ms at the center of the monitor. 
The display of the word pairs lasted for 3,000 ms. Word size on the monitor was 
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2.9 cm x 0.4 cm and distance between the two words was 0.8 cm. The words 
were six-letter German nouns. 
The dot appeared for 100 ms either 0.4 cm above the middle of the upper 
word or 0.4 cm below that of the lower word. The stimulus onset asynchrony 
(SOA) between word and dot display was fixed at 500 ms. The next trial began 
900 ms after the offset of the words or after the response, whichever occurred 
last. During the interval between word offset and the presentation of the next 
fixation cross, the computer screen remained blank. 
Procedure. The participants were tested in groups of two, with the two 
participants who were tested together always being assigned to the same 
experimental condition. They were seated back to back approximately 1 m apart 
and wore soundproof headphones. 
The experiment began with written instructions that were presented on the 
screen. The participants were provided with a description of the stimuli and the 
task. They were told to press one of the two labeled mouse keys of the computer 
as quickly as possible, depending on the location of the dot. If the dot appeared 
above the upper word, the participants were to press the left key with their right 
index finger. If the dot appeared below the lower word, they were required to 
press the right key with their right middle finger. The participants in the control 
groups were additionally informed that in each trial, one word would be 
presented in NV mode and the other one in RV mode. Any remaining questions 
were answered by the female experimenter at this point. 
The participants then performed two practice trials where the distractor 
words were always presented in NV mode in the experimental groups. In the 
control groups, one word was presented in NV mode and one in RV mode in 
each of the two practice trials. Subsequently, the participants were reminded to 
respond as quickly as possible and then started the experimental trials by 
pressing a key. Depending on experimental condition, the critical trial was 
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preceded by either 2, 12, 22, or 32 trials. Position of the RV word and of the dot 
in the critical trial were orthogonally combined, with each combination being 
presented approximately equally often within each condition.  
Immediately after the critical trial, the participants were asked to complete a 
four-item questionnaire (in this order): (a) "Do you remember one or both of the 
words in the last word pair? If yes, please write it down." (b) "Did the dot appear 
above or below the last word pair?" (above, below, don’t know). (c) "Was there 
anything unexpected about the displays on the screen? If yes, what was it?" (two 
lines were provided for the participants’ free responses). (d) "How surprising was 
the unexpected event for you?" A 9-point rating scale was provided with the end-
points "not at all" (0) and "very strongly" (8). 
Results and Discussion 
Unexpected event and surprise ratings. Two participants in the experimental 
groups failed to complete the questionnaire, answering only the recall question 
concerning the two words presented in the critical trial. As predicted, none of the 
66 participants in the control groups referred to the RV word as unexpected. In 
contrast, of the 62 participants in the experimental groups, 51 mentioned the 
appearance of the RV word in the critical trial as an unexpected event, χ2 (1; N = 
128) = 86.9, p < .001. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, the number of trials 
preceding the critical one had no effect on the frequency with which the RV word 
was mentioned as an unexpected event in the experimental groups, χ2 (3; N = 
62) = 1.1. 
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
____________________ 
 
The mean surprise ratings are also summarized in Table 1 (participants who 
did not make a rating were assigned a value of 0). A two-way between-subjects 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the surprise ratings with group (experimental 
vs. control) and number of trials (3, 13, 23, or 33) as factors, revealed only a 
reliable main effect for group, F(1, 120) = 53.4, MSE = 4.5, p < .001. As 
predicted, the mean surprise rating was significantly higher for experimental 
(3.8) than for control subjects (1.1). The other main effect and the interaction 
were not significant, Fs < 1.4. A separate one-way ANOVA of the surprise 
ratings in the experimental condition with number of trials as the factor also 
revealed no reliable effect, F < 0.5.  
Thus, in accord with the predictions the presentation of the RV word in the 
critical trial was regarded as an unexpected event that elicited surprise in the 
experimental groups but not in the control groups. However, contrary to 
predictions, the surprise ratings did not significantly differ among the four 
experimental groups. Possible reasons for this unexpected finding will be 
considered in the Introduction to Experiment 4. 
Response times. False responses and RTs exceeding the respective group 
mean by more than three standard deviations were treated as missing values in 
the RT analyses in all experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, two false 
responses were registered in the experimental groups and six in the control 
groups in the two trials preceding the critical one. Five false responses occurred 
in the critical trial in the experimental groups and five in the control groups. The 
RTs of one control subject (3-trials group) and three experimental subjects (one 
in each of the 3-, 13- and 33-trials group, respectively) exceeded the three 
standard deviations criterion. A two-way between-subjects ANOVA of the 
remaining subjects’ average RT of the two trials preceding the critical one 
(Baseline), with group and number of trials as factors, yielded no reliable effects, 
Fs < 1. 
The mean differences between the RTs in the critical trial and the Baseline 
are shown in Figure 2. A four-way between-subjects ANOVA with group 
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(experimental vs. control), number of trials (3, 13, 23, or 33), position of the RV 
word (upper vs. lower) and position of the dot (above vs. below) revealed reliable 
main effects for group, F(1, 80) = 63.1, MSE = 15,293, p < .001, and number of 
trials, F(3, 80) = 7.0, p<.01. More importantly, the predicted Group X Number of 
trials interaction was also reliable, F(3, 80) = 3.2, p < .05. Planned comparisons 
of the RT differences between adjacent experimental groups, using t-tests, 
revealed significant differences for the comparisons between the 3-trials and the 
13-trials groups (30 ms vs. 157 ms), t(25) = 2.3, SE = 53.9, p < .05, and the 13-
trials and 23-trials groups (157 ms vs. 269), t(27) = 1.8, SE = 61.7, p < .05 (one-
tailed). In contrast, the comparison of the RT differences of the 23-trials and 33-
trials experimental groups was not significant (269 ms vs. 245 ms), t(26) = 0.4. 
Planned comparisons for the control groups yielded no significant effects, ts < 
1.4. 
_____________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
_____________________ 
In addition, the four-way ANOVA also yielded a reliable interaction 
between group and position of the RV word, F(1, 80) = 5.8, p < .05, indicating 
that RT increase in the critical trial was longer for experimental subjects when 
the RV word was presented in the lower than in the upper position (205 ms vs. 
152 ms), whereas control subjects showed a small RT decrease when the RV 
word appeared in the lower position (-8 ms) and in the upper position (-13 ms). 
The remaining main effects and interactions were not reliable, Fs < 2.6. Finally, a 
comparison of the RTs in the critical trial with the Baseline within each of the 
four experimental and four control groups revealed significant RT increases only 
for the three experimental groups with 13, 23, and 33 trials, ts > 3.4, ps < .01. 
The RT increases in the four experimental groups is in line with the 
assumption that processes of schema revision are more difficult and require more 
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processing resources the greater the strength of the disconfirmed schema, up to a 
point. This point seemed to be reached in the present experiment after 23 uniform 
trials, given that the RT increase in the 33-trials group did not differ from that of 
the 23-trials group. 
Recall. Table 1 shows the percentage of the participants in the experimental 
and control groups who recalled the RV and the NV word and the position of the 
dot in the critical trial. As predicted, experimental subjects were better able to 
recall the RV than the NV word (39% vs. 8%), χ2(1, N = 64) = 17.4, p < .001, 
whereas control subjects’ recall performance for the RV and the NV word was 
almost identical (8% vs. 6%), χ2(1, N = 66) = 0.1. Furthermore and also in 
accord with the predictions, the experimental subjects differed reliably from 
control subjects with respect to the recall of the RV word, χ2(1, N = 130) = 18.6, 
p < .001, but not with respect to the recall of the NV word, χ2(1, N = 130) = 0.2. 
Furthermore, as predicted, the number of trials had no influence on the recall of 
the RV word by experimental and control groups, χ2s < 2.0. 
The position of the dot in the critical trial was correctly recalled by 81% of 
the experimental and by 47% of the control subjects, χ2 (1; N = 128) = 14.2, p < 
.01. For experimental subjects, recall of the dot position in the critical trial was 
also independent of the number of trials, χ2(3; N = 62) = 1.7. However, control 
subjects with 3 and 13 trials recalled the dot’s position better than control 
subjects with 23 and 33 trials (66% and 71% vs. 20 % and 31%), χ2 (3; N = 66) 
= 11.2, p < .05. 
The experimental subjects’ better recall of the RV word than that of the NV 
word in the critical trial supports the assumption that the schema-discrepant RV 
word but not the schema-congruent NV word received attention (see also 
Metcalfe, 1995). This assumption is additionally supported by the poor recall 
performance of the control groups for both the RV and the NV word in the 
critical trial, which indicates that the action-irrelevant and schema-congruent 
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words received only little attention even in the early trials of the experiment. 
Furthermore, the fact that recall of the RV word did not improve with schema 
strength and thus with the duration of the interruption of ongoing activities is in 
agreement with the schema-pointer plus tag model (Graesser, 1981) and with the 
"distinctiveness hypothesis" proposed by Hunt and Mitchell (1982). Both assume 
that memory performance does not necessarily covary with the duration of 
capacity allocation or of encoding processes. In addition, the fact that the recall 
of the RV in the critical trial was independent of the number of preceding trials is 
in line with the assumption that the more pronounced RT increase in the stronger 
schema groups is mainly due to differences in the processes of schema revision, 
rather than to a more extended analysis of the schema-discrepant RV word. 
Experiment 2 
A main result of Experiment 1 was the differential RT increases in the four 
experimental groups in the critical trial. It was argued that these differential RT 
increases reflect differences in the difficulty of the processes aimed at the 
integration of the schema-discrepant event into the existing schema. To 
corroborate this interpretation, a second experiment was conducted to provide 
empirical evidence that the occurrence of a schema-discrepant event indeed 
instigates schema revision processes. The main prediction tested in Experiment 2 
was that subsequent presentations of a RV trial would be considerably less 
schema-discrepant or even not schema-discrepant at all, regardless of the strength 
of the disconfirmed schema. Consequently, subsequent RV trials should lead to a 
smaller or no RT increase. This prediction was based on G. Mandler’s (1984) 
assumption that whereas "the normal [unconscious] course of learning is slow 
and cumulative" with the intervention of conscious awareness, schema revision 
can be "established quickly and in a saltatory fashion" (G. Mandler, 1984, p. 
106). 
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It is interesting to compare this schema theoretical approach with the 
predictions of neural network models of learning which have been offered as 
alternatives to schema theory (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988; Rumelhart, 
Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). The reason is that although these 
neural network models may be able to explain the RT findings in the single RV 
trial in the experimental groups of Experiment 1, it appears that the prediction 
derived from simple neural network models concerning the RTs in subsequent 
RV trials is at variance with the schema theoretical prediction described above. 
To see this, let me first consider a possible neural network explanation of 
the RT findings in the RV trial in the experimental groups of Experiment 1. 
According to these models, learning consists of the modification of the weights 
or the strength associated with the connections between the units of a neural net. 
Because the learning rate is a fixed parameter set at a low level, learning should 
always be a slow and continuous process. Hence, in Experiment 1 the strength of 
the connections among the units of the net should increase slowly and 
continuously with every NV-trial (up to the asymptote of learning) preceding the 
critical RV trial. To account for the RT delays in the critical trial, one would have 
to additionally assume, for example, that a neural net with strong connections 
among its units needs longer to settle in a stable state when disturbed (critical RV 
trial) than a net with weaker connections and that a response is emitted only after 
the net has reached that stable state. 
In contrast, the predictions derived from the schema-theoretical and the 
neural network approach concerning RTs in subsequent RV trials diverge. 
Because simple neural networks do not change the learning rate in a saltatory 
fashion and hence always learn slowly, they would seem to make the following 
predictions: (a) The time to settle in a stable state, and hence the RTs in the RV 
trials following the critical trial should initially be above Baseline and then  
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decrease continuously to the Baseline. (b) RTs in these trials should be longer, 
and the number of trials necessary to return to the Baseline should be higher, the 
more uniform trials preceded the critical one and hence the stronger the 
connections between the network units before the first RV trial. 
In Experiment 2, the same four experimental groups as in Experiment 1 
were tested, but no control groups were included. However, to examine the 
effects of the first RV display on subsequent RV presentations, the first RV trial 
was immediately followed by nine additional RV trials. After the tenth RV trial, 
a final NV trial was presented to test whether the re-presentation of the NV word 
after ten RV trials would now constitute a schema-discrepant event for the 
participants. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 43 female and 37 male students at the 
University of Bielefeld, Germany, with a mean age of 24.2 years (SD = 4.4). 
There were 20 participants in each of the four experimental groups. They were 
paid DM 2 for their participation. 
Apparatus and stimuli. Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1 
with the exception of the following changes: (a) Only four experimental but no 
control groups were tested. (b) In each of the four experimental groups, the 
critical trial (Trial 3, 13, 23, or 33, respectively) was followed by nine additional 
RV trials. The positions of the RV word and of the dot in the ten RV trials were 
balanced in each group. (c) In the critical trial, the RV word appeared always in 
the lower position and the dot appeared always above the upper NV word. (d) 
The final trial in each group consisted of a NV trial.  
The same questionnaire as in Experiment 1 was used. However, in contrast 
to Experiment 1, it was not presented immediately after the critical trial, but only 
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at the end of the experiment, that is, after ten more trials. In addition, the 
questions concerning the recall of the words and the position of the dot did not 
refer to the critical trial but to the last trial (i.e., the final NV trial). The reason for 
administering the questionnaire only at the end of the experiment was that the 
RTs in the trials following the critical one were of main interest. Therefore, it 
was deemed advisable not to risk contaminating these data by processes elicited 
by answering the questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion 
Unexpected event and surprise ratings. Only 35% of the participants in the 
3-trials group but at least 85% of the participants in each of the three remaining 
groups considered the RV-presentation an unexpected event, χ2 (3; N = 80) = 
20.9, p < .001. In addition, one participant mentioned the re-presentation of the 
NV word in the last trial after ten RV trials as unexpected. A one-way ANOVA 
of the surprise ratings resulted in a significant effect of the group factor, F(3, 76) 
= 8.2, MSE = 4.0, p < .001. A subsequent multiple range test (Duncan, p < .05) 
revealed that the mean surprise rating in the 3-trials group (0.90) was reliably 
lower than the mean surprise ratings in the 13, 23, and 33-trials groups (3.45, 
3.35, and 3.55, respectively). Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, the number of 
trials preceding the critical trial influenced the frequency of mentioning the RV 
event as unexpected and the surprise ratings. 
However, these findings may have been due to the fact that the 
questionnaire was not administered immediately following the critical trial but 
only after nine more RV trials and one final NV trial. As a consequence of this 
procedure, in the 3-trials group there were altogether ten RV trials but only three 
NV trials before the questionnaire was answered. In contrast, in the other groups 
there were always more NV trials than RV trials. Due to this difference in the 
ratio between RV and NV trials the subjects in the 3-trials group may not 
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retrospectively have considered the RV presentation as an unexpected but as a 
normal, because more frequent, event. 
Response times. Four false responses occurred in the critical trial, and seven 
in the two preceding (baseline) trials. The corresponding RTs were treated as 
missing values. In the critical trial, no RT exceeded the respective group mean by 
more than three standard deviations. 
A one-way ANOVA of the average RTs in the two baseline trials 
unexpectedly yielded a reliable group effect, F(3, 67) = 5.7, MSE = 14,890, p < 
.01. This effect was due to the fact that the Baseline was more than 100 ms 
longer in the 13-trials group (545 ms) than in each of the remaining groups (419 
ms, 438 ms, and 391 ms, respectively).  
The mean differences between the RT in the critical trial and the Baseline 
are shown in the upper panel of Figure 3. A one-way ANOVA of the differences 
revealed a reliable group effect, F(3, 67) = 3.9, MSE = 53,660, p < .05. Planned 
comparisons of the RT differences between adjacent groups, using t-tests, 
revealed only a significant difference between the 3-trials and the 13-trials group 
(94 ms vs. 244 ms), t(35) = 2.6, SE = 57.8, p < .05, whereas the comparisons 
between the 13-trials and the 23-trials group and between the 23-trials and 33-
trials group were not significant, ts < 1.3. Following a suggestion by Fazio 
(1990) concerning the treatment of unequal baselines, a percentage RT increase 
was computed (the ratio of RT differences in the critical trial to baseline RT). 
These data are shown in the lower panel of Figure 3. 
_____________________ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
_____________________ 
A one-way ANOVA of the percentage RT increase was significant, F(3, 67) 
= 4.6, MSE = 3,310, p < .01. Planned comparisons of the percentage RT 
increases between adjacent groups fully replicated the results obtained in 
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Experiment 1: The 3-trials group differed significantly from the 13-trials group 
(24% vs 50%), t(35) = 2.2, SE = 12.2, p < .05, and the 13-trials from the 23-trials 
group (50% vs. 83%), t(36) = 1.9, SE = 17.4, p < .05 (one-tailed). As in 
Experiment 1, the 23-trials group and the 33-trials group did not differ from each 
other (83% vs. 86%), t(32) = 0.1.  
In a subsequent analysis step, the Baseline RT was compared with the RT 
in the critical trial within each of the four groups. These comparisons revealed, in 
each group, significant RT increases from the Baseline to the critical trial, ts > 
4.0, ps < .01. 
To examine the effects of the first RV presentation on the RTs in 
subsequent RV trials, the RTs in the two trials following the critical trial were 
separately compared with the Baseline and with the RT in the critical trial within 
each of the four groups. RTs in the two trials after the critical trial did not 
significantly differ from Baseline in any of the groups, ts < 1.5. In contrast, RTs 
in the first and the second trial after the critical one were reliably faster than RTs 
in the critical trial (first trial: ts > 3.4, ps < .01; second trial: ts > 2.6, ps < .05). 
Furthermore, one-way ANOVAs of the percentage RT changes in the two trials 
after the critical one relative to the Baseline revealed no reliable differences 
between the four groups, Fs < 0.6. 
Hence, the RTs in the RV trials following the critical trial confirmed the 
prediction based on schema theory and contradict the prediction derived from 
simple neural network models of learning. The finding that RTs in the two trials 
immediately following the critical one (a) were reliably faster than RTs in the 
critical trial, (b) no longer differed from the Baseline in each of the four groups 
and (c) did not differ between the groups is in line with the schema-theoretical 
prediction that, regardless of schema strength, the RV event would become 
completely integrated into the schema, as a consequence of which subsequent 
RV presentations would be entirely schema-congruent. The issue whether more 
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sophisticated neural network models could provide for an alternative to the 
schema-theoretical approach will be discussed in the General Discussion. 
Finally, the re-presentation of two NV words in the final trial did not 
influence RT in this trial as compared with the average RT of the two preceding 
trials in any of the groups, ts < 0.7, confirming that subjects did not consider it an 
unexpected event. 
Recall. In agreement with participants’ statement that the re-presentation of 
two NV words in the final trial was not unexpected, none of them was able to 
recall a word presented in the final (NV) trial. The position of the dot in the final 
(NV) trial was recalled by 25% of the participants each in the 3-trials and 33-
trials groups, and by 35% of the subjects each in the 13-trials and 23-trials 
groups, χ2 (3; N = 80) = 0.9. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, schema strength was varied by manipulating the 
number of uniform trials preceding the schema-discrepant event. To generalize 
the findings of these experiments, Experiment 3 varied schema strength by 
manipulating the variability of the values with which schema variables are 
associated, while keeping trial number constant. Specifically, the variable 
constraints concerning the mode of word presentation were manipulated by either 
varying or keeping constant the font-types of the NV words in an equal number 
of trials preceding the critical one. 
In one experimental group (low schema strength), the font-type of one of 
the two NV words was varied in each of the noncritical trials, whereas in the 
second experimental group (high schema strength), the font-type of both words 
was kept constant across the same number of trials. In the latter experimental 
group, two NV words were presented in the standard font-type already used in 
the preceding experiments in each one of 35 trials preceding the critical one. In 
contrast, in the low schema strength group, one of the two NV words was shown 
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in the standard font-type and the other word in one of seven different font-types. 
Altogether, each of the seven font-types appeared five times in trials 1 - 35. In 
Trial 36, one word (that shown in standard font-type) was presented in RV mode. 
In the two corresponding control groups, the font-type was also either varied or 
kept constant. Additionally, one word (that shown in standard font-type) was 
presented in RV mode in each trial. Immediately after the critical trial, the 
subjects were asked to complete the same questionnaire already used in the 
preceding experiments. 
Based on the results of the previous experiments it was expected that the 
RV word in the critical trial would be a schema-discrepant event that elicits 
surprise in both experimental groups but not in the control groups, and would 
therefore result in an increase in RT and in enhanced recall of the RV word but 
not of the NV word in the former groups. More importantly, RT increase was 
expected to be more pronounced in the experimental group who had always seen 
the words presented in the same font-type (high schema strength) than in the 
experimental group with varied font-type (low schema strength). This prediction 
was based on the assumption that schema revision would be more difficult and 
hence more time-consuming in the high schema strength group (i.e., that with 
tight and rigid variable constraints) than in the low schema strength group (that 
with relaxed and flexible variable constraints). Based on the recall performance 
obtained in Experiment 1, no differences concerning recall of the RV word in the 
critical trial were predicted between the two experimental groups. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 50 female and 30 male students at the 
University of Bielefeld, Germany, with a mean age of 24.1 years (SD = 4.0). 
They were paid DM 2 for their participation. 
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. 
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Stimuli. Word size was 2.9 cm x 0.4 cm for the standard font-type, whereas 
the words presented in the seven different font-types were between 2.7 and 3.2 
cm wide and letter height varied between 0.4 and 0.6 cm. The sequence of events 
was the same as in the preceding experiments. 
Design. The experiment consisted of a 2 (experimental vs. control) x 2 
(constant font-type vs. varied font-type) between-subjects factorial design. There 
were 24 participants each in the two experimental groups, and 16 participants 
each in the two control groups. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 with the 
exception of two changes. First, participants were tested individually. Second, 
due to an error in the computer program controlling the experiment, the question 
concerning the position of the dot in the last trial was presented on the computer 
monitor immediately after the critical trial. Hence, only after participants had 
read this question were they handed the questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion 
Unexpected event and surprise ratings. None of the participants in the 
control groups but 77% of the participants in the experimental groups mentioned 
the RV word in the critical trial as an unexpected event, χ2 (1; N = 80) = 42.8, p 
< .001. As predicted, experimental groups with constant and varied font-type did 
not reliably differ from each other in this respect (83% vs. 71%), χ2 (1; N = 48) 
= 0.5. 
A two-way between-subjects ANOVA of the surprise ratings, with groups 
(experimental vs. control) and font-type (constant vs. varied) as factors, yielded a 
reliable main effect for groups only, F(1, 76) = 19.1, MSE = 5.8, p < .001, 
indicating higher surprise ratings for experimental than for control subjects (3.8 
vs. 1.3); remaining Fs < 2.2. A direct comparison of the surprise ratings of the 
two experimental groups revealed no significant difference (4.2 vs 3.3), t(46) = 
1.3, SE = 0.7. Hence, as in the previous experiments surprise ratings did not 
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differ significantly between experimental groups with low and high schema 
strength. 
Response times. In the two baseline trials, only one false response 
(experimental condition) was registered. In the critical trial, four false responses 
occurred, one in the control and three in the experimental condition. RTs in the 
critical trial of one control subject (font-type constant) and two experimental 
subjects (one with constant and one with varied font-type) exceeded their 
respective group means by more than three standard deviations. 
A two-way between-subjects ANOVA of the mean RTs of the two trials 
immediately preceding the critical one (Baseline), with group (experimental vs. 
control) and font-type (constant vs. varied) as factors, revealed no reliable effect, 
Fs < 1.2. 
______________________ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
______________________ 
The mean differences between the RTs in the critical trial and the Baseline 
are shown in Figure 4. A four-way between-subjects ANOVA with group, font-
type, position of the RV word (upper vs. lower) and position of the dot (above vs. 
below) yielded reliable main effects for group, F(1, 57) = 29.7, MSE = 21,539, p 
< .001, font-type, F(1, 57) = 8.6, p < .01, and position of the dot, F(1, 57) = 4.6, p 
< .05. The Group X Font-type interaction as well as the Font-type X Position of 
the dot interaction were also reliable, F(1, 57) = 6.0, p < .05, and F(1, 57) = 5.0, p 
< .05, respectively. The interaction between group and position of the dot was 
marginally significant, F(1, 57) = 3.7, p < .10. The remaining main effect and 
interactions were not reliable, Fs < 1.5. 
A follow-up analysis of the Group X Font-type interaction revealed that RT 
differences were not reliably different between the control groups with constant 
versus varied font-type (22 ms vs. 7 ms), t(28) = 0.8. However, as predicted and 
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replicating the results of the previous experiments with a different manipulation 
of schema strength, RT increase was reliably longer for experimental subjects 
with constant than for those with varied font-type (270 ms vs. 111 ms), t(41) = 
2.7, SE = 59.7, p < .05. Note that the schema-discrepant event concerns the word 
presented in the constant font-type used in trials 1 - 35 in both experimental 
groups. That is, although it was not the varied font-type word that was presented 
in RV mode in the low schema strength group, RT increase was significantly less 
pronounced due to the variation of the font-type of the other word in the 
preceding trials. 
This seems in good correspondence with the schema revision hypothesis 
proposed to account for the differential RT increases in the critical trial: The 
variation of the font-type of one of the two words in each trial preserves the 
relaxed and flexible variable constraints for the mode of word presentation. As a 
consequence, the variable constraints can be easily modified to adapt the schema 
to a discrepant input without the necessity to change the nature of the constraints 
(i.e., relaxed and flexible). The Font-type X Position of the dot interaction was 
due to a longer RT increase with constant than with varied font-type when the 
dot appeared below the words, (232 ms vs. 69 ms), t(33) = 2.2, SE = 74.8, p < 
.05, whereas no differences in RT increase were obtained between constant and 
varied font-type when the dot appeared above the words (97 ms vs 71 ms), t(36) 
= 0.7. 
Furthermore, RT increases were reliably longer in each experimental group 
than in its corresponding control group, t(35) = 3.9, SE = 63.0, p < .001, for 
groups with constant font-type (270 ms vs. 22 ms), and t(34) = 2.8, SE = 36.5, p 
< .01, for groups with varied font-type (111 ms vs. 7 ms). Finally, the RT 
increases from the Baseline to the critical trial were significant in both 
experimental groups, t(20) = 5.0, SE = 53.7, p<.001, and t(21) = 4.0, SE = 27.6, p 
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< .01, for constant and varied font-type, respectively, but for neither of the 
control groups, ts < 1.6. 
Recall. Replicating the findings of Experiment 1, experimental subjects 
were better able to recall the RV word than the NV word in the critical trial (29% 
vs. 2%), χ2 (1; N = 48) = 13.4, p < .001, whereas control subjects’ recall 
performance for the RV and the NV word was identical (13% each), χ2(1, N = 
32) = 0. Furthermore, the difference of the RV word recall (29% vs. 13%) and 
the NV word recall (2% vs. 13%) between the experimental and the control 
subjects were marginally reliable, χ2 (1; N = 80) = 3.1, p < .10, and χ2 (1; N = 
80) = 3.6, p < .06, respectively. In addition, there were no reliable differences in 
RV word recall (25% vs. 33%) and NV word recall (0% vs. 4%) between the 
experimental groups with constant and varied font-type, χ2s < 1.0. In the control 
groups, both the RV word and the NV word were each recalled by 19% of the 
subjects with constant font-type and by 6% of the subjects with varied font-type, 
χ2s < 1.2. Hence, the pattern of the recall performance for the RV and NV word 
in the critical trial for the most part confirms the assumption that the 
experimental subjects focus their attention selectively on the schema-discrepant 
RV word while simultaneously neglecting the schema-congruent NV word in the 
critical trial. Furthermore, the control subjects again seem to pay only little 
attention to both words.  
Finally, only four experimental and four control subjects failed to correctly 
recall the dot’s position in the critical trial, χ2 (1; N = 80) = 0.1. This finding was 
most likely due to the fact that in Experiment 3, in contrast to Experiment 1, the 
question concerning the position of the action-relevant dot appeared on the 
monitor immediately after the response in the last trial, thus favoring recall of the 
dot position. 
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Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 served two purposes. The first was to further investigate the 
relationship between schema strength and the feeling of surprise. Contrary to 
predictions, the previous experiments consistently found that the surprise ratings 
did not reliably vary with the manipulation of schema strength. However, this 
negative finding may have been due to insensitive measurement methods. For 
example, it could be argued that considering the short duration of surprise, the 
ratings were collected too late or were influenced by the answering of intervening 
questions. In support of this, the surprise ratings in the 3-trials group of 
Experiment 2, which were collected only after ten additional trials, were 
considerably lower than in the 3-trials group in Experiment 1. Even in 
Experiments 1 and 3, where surprise was rated immediately after the critical trial, 
participants first answered the questions concerning the words and the position of 
the dot in the last trial and the occurrence of an unexpected event. 
To remedy these potential problems, in Experiment 4 the surprise ratings 
were collected immediately after the occurrence of the schema-discrepant event 
without any intervening questions being asked. In addition, Experiment 4 was 
conducted with a larger sample of subjects per cell. Finally, following Frijda, 
Ortony, Sonnemans, and Clore (1992), the participants answered questions 
concerning two other aspects of the subjective experience of surprise apart from 
overall intensity, namely the duration and the peak amplitude of surprise. 
The second purpose of Experiment 4 was to obtain some information about 
the processes underlying the differential RT increases in the low and high 
schema strength groups observed in the previous experiments. It was previously 
argued that these RT differences reflect differences in the processes of schema 
revision. However, at present, alternative explanations cannot be excluded. For 
example, it could be argued that differences in one or more of the event-analysis 
processes proposed in the model described in the Introduction (verification, well-
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being, action-relevance checks, and causal analysis) were, alone or in 
combination, responsible for the RT results. To gain information about the 
processes underlying the differential RT increases, part of the participants in 
Experiment 4 were asked to estimate retrospectively how long they had been 
engaged in the various processes of the analysis of the schema-discrepant event 
and in schema revision. 
This verbal report method was deemed worthwhile for several reasons: (a) 
The event-analysis and schema revision processes elicited by the schema-
discrepant event are assumed to be conscious (G. Mandler, 1984), and conscious 
processes should be accurately reflected in verbal reports (Ericsson & Simon, 
1993; Wilson, 1994). (b) The accuracy of verbal reports about conscious 
cognitive processes is generally assumed to increase the shorter the duration of 
the task and the interval between task completion and the gathering of the verbal 
reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Wilson, 1994). As a consequence, verbal 
reports about the event-analysis and schema revision processes should be 
especially accurate because the unexpected event was of short duration and the 
verbal reports were gathered immediately thereafter. (c) Verbal reports can 
provide information that is difficult to obtain by other means (Crutcher, 1994). 
(d) Finally, the verbal report measure used in the present experiment is in accord 
with the use of verbal reports in the field of metacognition, where verbal reports 
have a prominent status. As stated by Nelson (1996), "the metacognitive 
approach is to formulate verbal reports as meta-level statements about what is 
occurring at the object-level, to operationalize what is occurring at the object-
level through some kind of observable criterion response, and then to assess 
empirically the degree of relationship between the verbal report and the criterion 
response" (p. 106). In the present experiment the criterion response that can be 
compared to the verbal reports concerning the duration of the various cognitive 
processes is the RT increase in the critical trial in the two experimental groups. 
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Method 
Participants. A total of 180 students at the University of Bielefeld 
participated in Experiment 4. Eight participants had to be excluded from the data 
analyses, three participants because of computer malfunction, four because they 
failed to notice the inverted word and hence could not answer the questionnaire, 
and one participant because she did not comply with instructions. This left 84 
male and 88 female participants with a mean age of 23.3 years (SD = 3.5), who 
were not paid for their participation. 
Design. There were two groups in Experiment 4, a 3-trials group and a 33-
trials group. Within the 3-trials group, 46 participants answered the feeling of 
surprise questionnaire, and 39 participants the analysis of the surprising event 
and schema revision questionnaire immediately after the critical trial. Within the 
33-trials group, 47 participants answered the feeling of surprise questionnaire, 
and 40 participants the analysis of the surprising event and schema revision 
questionnaire. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure was also the same as in Experiment 1 with the 
exception of the questionnaire that participants answered immediately after the 
critical trial. Each question was presented on a separate page. The participants 
were asked to complete the questionnaire by answering one question after the 
other without turning back pages to consult previous answers. Two different 
questionnaires were used. The questions contained in the two different 
questionnaires are reprinted in Table 2.  
____________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
____________________ 
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The participants who answered the questionnaire concerned with the feeling 
of surprise were asked to indicate the overall intensity of surprise and its peak 
amplitude on nine-point rating scales with the end points "not at all" (0) and 
"very strongly" (8). For the question referring to the duration of the feeling of 
surprise, a scale ranging from 0 to 1,200 ms in 100 ms steps was provided.² If the 
participants thought that their feeling of surprise lasted still longer, they were 
asked to note down its estimated duration next to the scale. 
The participants who answered the questionnaire referring to the analysis of 
the surprising event and schema revision were asked to indicate on 11-point 
rating scales how long they had been engaged with each of the described 
processes. The scale ranged from "not at all" (0) to "very long" (10), with 
intermediate scale points labeled "very short" (1), "short" (3), and "long" (7). 
Results and Discussion 
Response times. In the two baseline trials 13 false responses occurred. In 
the critical trial, 18 false responses were registered, 12 in the 3-trials group and 
six in the 33-trials group. In addition, the RTs in the critical trial of two 
participants in each of the two groups exceeded the three standard deviations 
criterion. The baseline RTs of the remaining participants were significantly 
longer in the 3-trials group than in the 33-trials group (516 ms vs. 456 ms), t(131) 
= 2.2, SE = 27.2, p < .05. A three-way between-subjects ANOVA of the 
differences between the RT in the critical trial and baseline RT with number of 
trials (3 vs. 33), position of the RV word (upper vs. lower) and position of the dot 
(above vs. below) as factors revealed only a reliable main effect for number of 
trials, F(1, 125) = 27.7, MSE = 51,165, p < .001.³ Replicating the basic finding of 
the previous experiments, RT increase in the critical trial was larger for the 33-
trials group than for the 3-trials group (284 ms vs. 80 ms). The remaining effects 
were not reliable, Fs < 2. Finally, an analysis of RT increase from Baseline to the 
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critical trial revealed significant increases in both experimental groups, ts > 4.0, 
ps < .001. 
Feeling of surprise. One of the 93 subjects who received the surprise 
questionnaire answered only the first question. The means of the obtained ratings 
in the 3-trials and 33-trials groups are summarized in Table 3. T-tests revealed a 
significant difference between the two groups with respect to overall felt 
surprise, t(91) = 4.3, SE = 0.4, p < .001, reflecting that overall surprise intensity 
was higher in the 33-trials group than in the 3-trials group (5.4 vs. 3.6; cf. Table 
3). With respect to peak amplitude and duration of surprise, the differences 
between groups went in the same direction, but failed to reach significance, ts < 
1.7. Thus, contrary to the results of the preceding experiments, overall felt 
surprise was found to be reliably stronger in the 33-trials group than in the 3-
trials group. 
____________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
____________________ 
A comparison of this finding with those of Experiment 1 (which allows for 
the closest comparison with Experiment 4) suggests that it was mostly due to the 
fact that the surprise ratings obtained for the 33-trials group in Experiment 4 
were higher (5.4) than those obtained for the 33-trials group in Experiment 1 
(4.4). In contrast, the mean surprise ratings in the 3-trials groups were almost 
identical in the two experiments (3.6 vs. 3.4). This finding is in accord with the 
hypothesis that existing group differences in Experiment 1 were leveled out 
because the ratings were collected only after several intervening questions. 
Presumably, after this delay, the participants no longer had a precise memory 
about the actual surprise intensity, which made them uncertain which rating scale 
category was most appropriate. This uncertainty, in turn, may have caused them 
to rely on the intermediate scale categories. 
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In contrast to overall surprise intensity, there were no significant differences 
between the 3-trials and the 33-trials groups with respect to the peak amplitude 
and the duration of the feeling of surprise. One possible explanation for this 
pattern of results would be that the peak amplitude of the surprise feeling lasts 
longer if the schema-discrepant event deviates from a strong schema. If so, 
overall surprise intensity could be higher in the strong schema group than in the 
weak schema group even though the peak amplitude and the duration of the 
surprise feeling do not differ between groups.  
Another explanation of these findings might be that the rating of overall 
surprise intensity, but not of the duration and the peak amplitude of surprise, 
were influenced by factors in addition to the actual intensity of surprise. For 
example, in line with self-perception theory (Bem, 1972), the person’s awareness 
of the delay in the execution of the required action caused by the schema-
discrepant event may have influenced the overall surprise ratings, but not the 
more specific question concerning the peak amplitude and the duration of the 
surprise feeling (see also Ritter, 1997; Schützwohl, 1997a). Parenthetically, it 
should be noted that if correct, this self-perception explanation of the differential 
effect of the number of trials on the overall surprise intensity ratings suggests that 
felt surprise was not in fact more intense in the 33-trials group than in the 3-trials 
group. 
Analysis of the surprising event and schema revision. Seventy-nine 
participants answered the questionnaire asking for the duration of the various 
event-analysis processes and with schema revision. Two of them failed to 
complete the questionnaire. The mean ratings in the two groups are also shown in 
Table 3. In line with the schema revision hypothesis, the two groups differed 
reliably with respect to the question asking for how long they had been engaged 
with processes of schema revision, t(76) = 2.4, SE = 0.6, p < .05. Participants in 
the 33-trials group reported to have been engaged longer with processes of 
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schema revision than participants in the 3-trials group (4.2 vs. 2.8). The 
remaining comparisons were not reliable, ts < 1.7. 
Thus, the results concerning the duration of the processes of the analysis of 
the schema-discrepant event and of schema revision were clear-cut: As predicted, 
only the duration of schema revision processes was rated higher in the 33-trials 
group than in the 3-trials group, hence reflecting the differences in RT increase in 
the two groups. This lends empirical support to the assumption that schema-
discrepant events are in fact more difficult to integrate into a strong than into a 
weak schema (e.g., Belmore, 1987; Bindra, 1959; Rumelhart et al., 1986). In 
addition, it is noteworthy that the subjects in both schema strength groups 
indicated that the discrepancy verification took only very little time. This is not 
surprising, because the RV display was a very salient event, thus facilitating the 
verification task. Similarly, the appraisal of the implications of the schema-
discrepant event for well-being was judged to be of very brief duration only. This 
was probably due to the fact that it is easy to identify the occurrence of the RV 
event as irrelevant for well-being and as therefore not requiring further 
processing. 
Somewhat more time was reported for the action-relevance check and the 
causal analysis of the schema-discrepant event (Table 3). However, there were 
again no differences between the 3-trials and the 33-trials group. Apparently, the 
participants in both groups arrived equally quickly at the same conclusions, 
namely that the change in the appearance of the words is part of the experimental 
procedure (Schützwohl & Reisenzein, in press) and is irrelevant for the key-
pressing task (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, in press).  
General Discussion 
The purpose of the present experiments was to study the effect of schema 
strength on three components of surprise, namely the feeling of surprise, the 
interruption of ongoing activities, and the focusing of attention. 
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Feeling of Surprise 
The feeling of surprise was reported to have been of brief duration in the 
present experiments, and unless measured immediately after the critical trial 
without any intervening questions, it did not reliably increase with schema 
strength. Only when the subjects rated their feeling of surprise straight after the 
surprising event had occurred, was overall surprise intensity found to be more 
pronounced when the schema-discrepant event deviated from a strong than from 
a weak schema. This difference was, however, restricted to the overall surprise 
intensity rating, whereas no significant differences were obtained for the peak 
amplitude and the duration of surprise. Because factors such as the person’s 
awareness of action delay may have contributed to the rating of overall felt 
surprise, the issue whether the feeling of surprise increases with schema strength 
(as defined in the present experiments) remains as yet not fully settled.  
Interruption of Ongoing Activities 
It was consistently found that the duration of the interruption of ongoing 
activities increased with the strength of the disconfirmed schema. This finding 
was taken as indicating that the schema-discrepant event is increasingly more 
difficult to integrate into the disconfirmed schema the greater its strength. Some 
empirical support for this explanation was obtained in Experiment 4, in which 
subjects estimated the process of schema revision to be more time consuming if 
the disconfirmed schema was strong rather than weak, whereas the estimated 
duration of the other processes concerned with the analysis of the surprising 
event was found not to differ significantly between the strong and weak schema 
group. 
This is of course not intended to imply that the processes of the analysis of 
the schema-discrepant event always take a constant amount of time. For example, 
in a recent experiment (Schützwohl, 1997b) it was found that an affectively 
negative surprising event caused a longer interruption of ongoing activities than 
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an affectively positive one. In this case, the subjects reported no differences with 
respect to the duration of the schema revision process, but the causal analysis of 
the surprising event was reported to have taken longer when the schema-
discrepant event was affectively negative. 
The present RT findings seem to be relevant to a central assumption of 
several theories of associative learning (Öhman, 1979; Pearce & Hall, 1980; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1978; cf. Dickinson, 1980). This assumption 
holds that one or both elements of an association (E1 and E2) are processed 
increasingly longer, the more unexpected or surprising they are, with 
unexpectedness being a function of the associative strength between the two 
elements. Specifically, the greater the associative strength between E1 and E2, 
the greater the unexpectedness of an omission or a change in the appearance of 
E2 after E1 has been presented. 
In line with this assumption, Siddle and Packer (Packer & Siddle, 1989; 
Siddle & Packer, 1987) found that RTs to a secondary probe were slower during 
unexpected trials, indicating that unexpected events indeed demand processing 
resources. However, these authors did not explicitly address the theoretically 
important assumption of a linear (or at least monotonic) relationship between the 
unexpectedness of an event and the amount of processing devoted to it. In 
contrast, on the condition that schema strength and associative strength can be 
taken to be sufficiently similar concepts, the experiments presented in this article 
provide some empirical support for the assumption of a linear relationship 
between unexpectedness and amount of processing. 
Focusing of attention 
Experimental subjects were better able to recall the RV word than the NV 
word in the critical trial. In addition, RV word recall but not NV word recall 
differed between experimental and control groups. Finally, recall of the RV word 
in the experimental groups did not vary with schema strength. This pattern of 
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results is in line with an encoding-and-retrieval explanation of the effects of 
surprising events on memory. Better recall of the RV word but not of the NV 
word in the critical trial in experimental groups strongly suggests that the 
surprising event receives increased attention during encoding. However, because 
the duration of attention allocation to the RV event did not enhance the recall of 
the RV word, it seems necessary to assume that the main effect of attending to 
the RV event was to facilitate its retrieval. This facilitation effect may have been 
due to the surprising event being stored separately in memory or being marked 
with a tag (Graesser, 1981). 
This explanation bears some similarities with the processes made 
responsible for the superior recall of isolated items (the so called von Restorff 
effect; von Restorff, 1933) or distinct items (e.g., Bruce & Gaines, 1976; Fabiani 
& Donchin, 1995; Schmidt, 1991), but there are also a number of important 
differences between surprising and isolated or distinct events. First, the isolation 
effect is obtained under intentional learning instructions; it usually does not occur 
under conditions of incidental learning. In a review of the research concerned 
with the isolation effect, Wallace (1965) stated that "the only case of the isolation 
effect occurring in the absence of intent to learn was when a single item was 
isolated in a manner which was relevant to the learner’s task, that is, isolation 
was directly related to the response required of the subject" (Wallace, 1965, p. 
416). In contrast, the present experiments constituted an incidental learning 
situation where the surprising event was irrelevant for the response required of 
the subjects. Nonetheless, a superior recall of the surprising word was obtained. 
Second, although Green (1956) explicitly attempted to account for the 
isolation effect by referring to the “surprise value“ of the isolated item, surprise 
is clearly not a necessary condition for the isolation effect to occur. For example, 
both Green himself (1958) and, more recently, Fabiani and Donchin (1995) 
instructed their subjects in advance as to the nature of the items (including the 
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isolated items) that would be presented, thus reducing or even eliminating 
surprise. Nonetheless, an isolation effect was found in both studies. 
Third, for the isolation effect to occur it is not necessary that subjects know 
about the status of the isolated item at the time of its presentation. As a 
consequence, the isolation effect is also obtained in the absence of increased 
attention during encoding. This was in fact already shown by von Restorff (1933) 
in her original experiments. For example, von Restorff presented her participants 
lists consisting of nine heterogeneous items, followed by nine homogeneous 
items and an isolated item that was presented after the first homogeneous item. 
That is, at the time of presentation of the isolated item, the subjects had seen nine 
heterogeneous items and one item from the homogeneous list (which at the time 
of its presentation was just another heterogeneous item). Because the status of the 
isolated item became apparent only after the presentation of eight additional 
homogeneous items, the subjects could not preferentially encode the isolated 
item at the time of its presentation. This is in clear contrast to the experiments 
reported in this article, where the status of the surprising event became known at 
the time of its presentation, as a consequence of which it received increased 
attention during encoding. 
Interruption of Ongoing Activities and Focusing of Attention 
Taken together, the RT increases in the critical trial and the enhanced 
memory performance for the RV word observed in the experiments reported here 
indicate that schema-discrepant events capture attention. The assumption that 
schema-discrepant stimuli capture attention may be considered to be a variant of 
the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis proposed by Folk, Remington, 
and Johnston (1992, 1993). 
According to this hypothesis, involuntary shifts of attention depend on the 
relation between specific stimulus properties and characteristics of the individual 
such as active goals and prior experience. Folk et al. (1993) illustrate the 
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proposed mechanism of attentional capture by using the analogy of a thermostat 
"in which the set-point is programmed (off-line) on the basis of top-down goals, 
but the on-line response of the device to a temperature change is bottom-up or 
stimulus driven. We argue that high level cognitive processes (as well as other 
factors such as experience) determine how the attentional control system is set, 
but that given that setting, the on-line response to events is purely stimulus 
driven, with no role played by high-level cognitive processes" (Folk et al., 1993, 
p. 682). 
In line with this hypothesis, in the experiments reported here (see also 
Meyer et al., 1991; Niepel et al., 1994), attentional capture by schema-discrepant 
events depended on the relation between stimulus properties (the RV word) and 
subject characteristics (the previously acquired schema). More precisely, 
attention was captured by those properties of the RV word that exceeded the 
variable constraints of the currently activated schema. Presumably, this kind of 
attention capture is also purely stimulus driven, requiring no higher-level 
cognitive processes. 
However, it should be noted that despite these basic common 
characteristics, attentional capture by schema-discrepant stimuli also differs in 
two important respects from the process of attentional capture observed in the 
experiments by Folk et al. (1992). In their experiments, which were conducted to 
test the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis using a spatial cueing 
paradigm, a cue was presented for 50 ms at one of four possible target locations. 
After a 100 ms fixation display the target was presented for 50 ms. These authors 
found that the cue captured attention involuntarily only when it shared properties 
with the target and did not capture attention when it did not. Thus, the attentional 
control system was pre-set by properties of the target stimulus. 
In the experiments reported here, in contrast, the attentional control system 
was set by the variable constraints of the currently active schema, which in turn 
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were determined by the previous experience of the subjects. In addition, in the 
Folk et al. experiments, attention was captured by those properties of a cue which 
it shared with the target. In contrast, the attention-capturing effect of schema-
discrepant stimuli is due to properties which they do not share with the currently 
activated schema. 
In sum, then, the attentional system seems not only sensitive to goal-
relevant stimulus properties, but also to schema-discrepant ones. As a matter of 
fact, the latter kind of attentional capture seems to correspond more closely to the 
thermostat analogy used by Folk et al. (1992) than the situation examined in their 
own experiments, because a thermostat responds only when the temperature 
deviates from the top-down determined set-point. 
Both mechanisms of attention capture, however, are important for 
successful person-environment transactions: Attention capture by goal-relevant 
events permits the efficient preparatory allocation of processing resources in 
ongoing person-environment transactions, whereas attention capture by schema-
discrepant events is a mechanism that enables, by means of schema revision or 
knowledge-updating, an effective prediction and control of future occurrences of 
the previously schema-discrepant event. 
Alternative accounts of the present findings 
In the concluding paragraphs I would like to briefly discuss two possible 
alternative accounts of the present findings. The first alternative account, that 
was already briefly considered with respect to the RT findings in Experiments 1 
and 2, concerns neural network models. It was suggested there that although 
simple neural network models may be able to explain the RT increases in the first 
critical RV trial in the experimental groups with varying numbers of uniform NV 
trials preceding the critical one, they are at variance with the RTs in the 
subsequent RV trials. Already in the first RV trial following the critical one RTs 
were no longer delayed, suggesting an abrupt learning process. This finding 
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poses a problem for simple neural network models because in these models 
learning is always a slow and continuous rather than an abrupt process (due to 
the assumption of a constant and low learning rate). 
However, it appears that this problem is not an inherent limitation of neural 
network models in general. Recently, Phaf, Mul and Wolters (1994) proposed a 
novel neural network architecture that allows networks to learn quickly by means 
of an abrupt increase in the learning rate. More precisely, these authors assume 
that familiar stimuli cause only minimal competition among the network units 
and that as a consequence, only base-rate learning takes place. In contrast, novel 
stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are not yet represented in the network), are assumed to 
produce much competition among the network units. This, in turn, is assumed to 
cause a sudden increase in the learning rate and to instigate a random exploratory 
activation process that helps to resolve the competition and to form a new 
representation. Hence, this model seems to be capable of explaining the present 
RT findings if one assumes that the first RV presentation causes competition 
among the network units which, in turn, results in an abrupt increase in learning 
rate and the formation of a new representation. 
Even if one grants that sophisticated neural network models such as the one 
just described are able to handle the RT findings, the question remains if and how 
such a model would account for the findings concerning the two remaining 
surprise indicators measured in the present experiments. Phaf et al. (1994) do not 
specify, for example, the relation between the amount of competition among the 
network units caused by the novel stimulus, the time needed to form a new 
representation and the memory performance for this new representation. 
Therefore, no precise prediction concerning memory performance for the RV 
word in the experimental groups can be derived from this model. 
Furthermore, although the model is explicitly concerned with the 
consequences of novel stimuli within neural networks, this does not imply that it 
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is also able to handle the consequences of (not necessarily new) surprising 
events. No surprise or similar mechanism is incorporated in this model. As a 
consequence, it remains mute with respect to the subjective experience of 
surprise investigated in the present experiments and other surprise components 
such as the facial expressions (cf. Meyer et al., 1994). In conclusion, it appears 
that existing neural network models do not offer a complete account of the 
present findings and therefore are not, at present, fully satisfactory alternatives to 
the proposed schema-theoretical approach. However, this does of course not 
exclude the possibility that more satisfactory neural networks could be developed 
in the future. 
Finally, I would like to briefly consider a second alternative account of the 
present findings that was proposed by a reviewer. To explain some cases of 
surprise, Kahneman and Miller (1986; see also Kahneman, 1995) proposed "a 
supplement to the generally accepted idea that events in the stream of experience 
are interpreted and evaluated by consulting precomputed schemas" (p. 136). 
These authors assume that surprise is sometimes produced by a contrast 
between an event and its counterfactual alternatives which are constructed after 
the occurrence of the event. Kahneman and Miller (1986) were mainly concerned 
with the elicitation of surprise rather than with its consequences. Therefore, their 
account seems mainly applicable to the subjective feeling of surprise. 
Presumably, this alternative account would hold that the intensity of surprise 
increases with the availability of counterfactual alternatives. After 32 NV trials, a 
counterfactual alternative to the RV presentation (namely, another NV trial) 
should be more readily available than after two NV trials; therefore, the feeling 
of surprise should be more intense in the 33-trials group. 
To account for the present findings concerned with action delay and the 
focusing of attention on the surprise-eliciting event strictly in terms of 
counterfactual thinking seems less easy. In fact, one would predict effects 
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contrary to those found. First, because after 32 NV trials a counterfactual 
alternative should be more readily available than after two NV trials, the 
interruption of ongoing processes should be shorter in the 33-trials group than in 
the 3-trials group. Second, because the construction of counterfactual alternatives 
is a backward-thinking process, the focus of attention is on relevant past events 
stored in memory. This focus of attention should, if anything, interfere with 
paying attention to the surprising event. Therefore, recall of the RV word (the 
index of the focusing of attention) might be expected to be reduced in the 
experimental groups. None of these predictions is supported by the present 
findings. Besides, counterfactual thinking per se cannot explain why the attention 
is focused on the surprising event after all. 
However, it is possible that Kahneman and Miller’s and the present schema 
theoretical approach to surprise differ only with respect to the processes that 
elicit surprise, whereas they are in agreement with respect to the components and 
the consequences of surprise. The main question would then be, whether or not 
the present experiments realized a case of the elicitation of surprise through the 
contrast between an event and a precomputed schema or a postcomputed 
counterfactual alternative. Kahneman and Miller (1986) themselves point out that 
the "notion of a schema is most useful in dealing with information that is needed 
often and that can be applied time after time" (p.139). These are precisely the 
conditions realized in the present experiments, thus backing up the 
appropriateness of the present schema-theoretical stance. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Percentage of subjects in the experimental and control groups with 3, 
13, 23, or 33 trials, who referred to the RV word in the critical trial as an 
unexpected event, and recalled the RV and NV word and the dot’s position in the 
critical trial, as well as their mean surprise ratings. 
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Table 2. Questions contained in the two different questionnaires used in 
Experiment 4. 
 
A. Feeling of surprise 
_____________________________________________________________ 
(1) How surprised were you about the black bar in the last trial? 
(overall surprise intensity) 
(2) How intense was the feeling of surprise at its peak? 
(peak amplitude) 
(3) How long did the feeling of surprise last? (duration) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
B. Analysis of the surprising event and schema revision 
_____________________________________________________________ 
(1) I made sure that one word was indeed presented inside a black bar. 
(verification) 
(2) I wondered whether the presentation of the black bar has something to 
do with my task. (action relevance) 
(3) I wondered why one word was presented inside a black bar in the last 
trial. (causal analysis) 
(4) I was thinking about how to evaluate the occurrence of the black bar 
(something positive, something negative, or neutral). (well-being) 
(5) I adjusted myself for further presentations of the black bar in 
upcoming trials. (schema revision) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3. Mean ratings for the various aspects of the feeling of surprise and for the 
duration of the event analysis and schema revision processes in the 3-trials and 
the 33-trials groups in Experiment 4. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The sequence of the presentation of the stimuli for a given trial, and 
examples of the words presented in NV trials and in the RV trial. 
Figure 2. Mean differences between the RTs in the critical trial and the Baseline 
for experimental and control groups in Experiment 1 with 3, 13, 23, or 33 trials, 
respectively. 
Figure 3. Mean differences (upper panel) and mean percentage differences (lower 
panel) between the RTs in the critical trial and the Baseline for experimental 
groups in Experiment 2 with 3, 13, 23, or 33 trials, respectively. 
Figure 4. Mean differences between the RTs in the critical trial and the Baseline 
for experimental and control groups with constant and varied font-types in 
Experiment 3. 
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Footnotes 
1. Notice that the present model shares many assumptions regarding the 
consequences of schema-discrepant events with G. Mandler’s theory of 
cognition. The major difference between the two approaches consists of their 
scope: Whereas Mandler’s theory is intended as a theory of emotion elicitation in 
general, the present analysis is restricted to the emotion of surprise. 
2. The range of this scale was based on the range of RT increases usually 
obtained in the critical trial of the present experiments. 
3. The three-way between-subjects ANOVA of the percentage RT increases 
revealed the same significant main effect for the number of trials. 
